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RECENT TRENDS IN HIGHWAY
CONDEMNATION LAWt
ORRIN L. HELSTAD*
I. INTRODUCTION
Extensive post-war road building programs have led to a great deal of
judicial and legislative activity in the field of condemnation law, but the
attorney or highway administrator confronted with day to day problems
probably seldom has the opportunity to look beyond the law of his own state
or in any event beyond the law pertaining to the specific problem with which
he'is confronted. It is the objective of this paper to provide a broader view
of recent happenings in the field of highway condemnation law and to sketch
such major trends as seem to be apparent on a nationwide basis.
The subject I have chosen to discuss is a broad one, particularly since it
purports to cover the law of all the states. In order to keep the length of
the paper within reasonable bounds, it will be necessary to relegate much
of the illustrative and supporting material to footnotes. I hope, however,
that the paper will provide an overview of happenings in the field of high-
way condemnation law which is not readily available to the attorney or
administrator who is confronted with the day-to-day problems in this field.
This paper is based primarily upon information gathered in a study being
conducted under a contract between the Bureau of Public Roads and the
University of Wisconsin. The Study focuses on highway condemnation law
during the period of 1946 through 1961 and includes, among other things,
a review of legislation and litigation pertaining to highway condemnation
during that period. Because 16 years is a relatively brief period on which
to base conclusions as to major trends in decisional law, the principal focus
of this paper necessarily will be on legislative law. Some attention also will
be given to the interrelationship of the legislative and judicial processes in
the development of condemnation law.
The discussion of trends will be divided among three major areas of con-
demnation law: (a) the right of the condemnor to condemn; (b) the right
of the owner to receive just compensation; and (c) condemnation proce-
t This was presented at the 43rd Annual Meeting of the Highway Research Board,
January 13-17, 1964, Washington, D. 0. It will be published later in the Highway
Research Record and is printed here by permission of the Highway Research Board. The
author is indebted to Mrs. Eleanore Roe, research assistant, University of Wisconsin Law
School, for research assistance in the preparation of the paper.
* Associate Professor of Law, the University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin.
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dure. Before proceeding to a discussion of trends, however, it might be well
to take a brief look at the sample of legislation and litigation on which this
discussion is based. The survey of litigation is limited to the reported cases
of 25 states.' Nevertheless, this involves almost 800 cases. The survey of
legislation covers the laws of all states enacted during the 1946-1961 period,
and occasional references also will be made to laws enacted subsequent to
1961. About 60 per cent of the cases were decided from 1957 through 1961.
The volume of litigation appears to correspond roughly with the increase
in land acquisition brought about by the interstate highway program. Leg-
islative activity in the condemnation field appears to show a more even
distribution, but it is quite evident that this activity also has increased in
recent years.
II. THE RIGHT OF THE CONDEMNOR TO CONDEMN
It is often said that the only real problem in most condemnation cases is
to determine the compensation to which the landowner is entitled. This
may be true, but the fact remains that in almost 14 percent of the reported
highway condemnation cases which were reviewed, the landowner, in addi-
tion to other contentions which he may have been making, was challenging
the right of the condemnor to proceed with the condemnation. Moreover,
about a hundred different enactments on the part of state legislatures dealt
with this aspect of highway condemnation law during the period of 1946
to 1963. We are not, therefore, dealing with an entirely moot problem.
What have been the significant trends in this area of the law in the last
15 years or so? In general, it can be stated quite categorically that the trend
has been toward expanding the powers of the condemnor. All but a very
few of the legislative enactments have tended to expand or clarify rather
than to restrict the condemnation powers of highway agencies. And only
in about one out of six of the cases in which the landowner challenged the
proceedings (slightly more than two percent of all the cases) did the chal-
lenge meet with any success. Nevertheless, it may be helpful to examine
briefly some of the specific aspects of the problem.
The right of the condemnor to condemn may be challenged on the
ground that the taking is not for a public use or is not necessary to the con-
templated public use or is not authorized by statute, as well as on certain
other grounds. We will now examine briefly some of these specific aspects
of the problem.
1. These states are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, Rhode Island,
Vermont, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
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A. The Public Use Requirement
The constitutional requirement that the condemned property must be
taken for a public use has not proved to be an important issue in connection
with condemnation for highway purposes, but it does arise occasionally in
unusual or peripheral situations. Statutes authorizing condemnation for
"private ways of necessity" occasionally are challenged (usually without
success) on the ground that the taking is not for a public use.2 Originally,
these statutes were designed to provide access to agricultural lands which
could be reached from a public highway only by crossing the lands of others.
The modem counterpart of this situation is the parcel which becomes land-
locked because of the construction of a controlled-access highway which
cuts it off from the public highway system. At least one court, without
much discussion, has concluded that a roadway to provide access to land
isolated from any public road would be solely for the benefit of the owner
of such land and those having business with him and that to permit such
a road to be laid out therefore would constitute the taking of property for
private use in violation of the constitution.' The more usual attitude, how-
ever, is exemplified by an opinion of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts in which it said that the condemnation of right of way for an access
road for the benefit of parcels of land incidentally deprived of all or of some
means of access by reason of a major freeway project is but a by-product
of the major project which unquestionably is for a public purpose.4 A
similar view has been taken in cases involving the acquisition of land for
toll-road service facilities, such as restaurants and filling stations.'
B. The Necessity of the Taking
The question whether the taking is necessary has been raised somewhat
more often than the question whether the proposed use is public, but cer-
tainly without any more success. In the absence of a controlling statute, the
general rule which seems to be followed is that a finding of necessity by the
condemnor will not be disturbed in the absence of fraud, bad faith or gross
abuse of discretion on the part of the condemnor. Contentions by land-
owners that the highway might better be constructed in a different location
than that proposed by the highway authorities almost invariably are un-
2. E.g., Stein v. Darby, 126 So.2d 313 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1961); State ex rel. Happel
v. Schmidt, 252 Wis. 82, 30 N.W.2d 220 (1947).
3. Libbee v. Imhoff, 11 Ill. App. 2d 344, 137 N.E.2d 85 (1956).
4. Luke v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, 337 Mass. 304, 149 N.E.2d 225 (1958).
5. Opinion of the Justices, 330 Mass. 713, 113 N.E.2d 452 (1953); Illinois State Toll
Highway Conm'n v. Eden Cemetery Ass'n, 16 Ill.2d 539, 158 N.E.2d 766 (1959).
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successful.' A question of considerable current importance is the extent to
which the rule that the condemnor's determination of the necessity of the
taking will not be reviewed by the courts (in the absence of fraud, bad
faith, or abuse of discretion) permits the taking of land for future highway
needs. Here again, the courts appear to have been generally sympathetic
to the condemnor's cause, provided the highway agency in question at least
had some reasonably definite plans for future construction.'
There does not appear to have been much legislative activity in recent
years with regard to determinations of necessity. However, there are at
least a couple of disturbing clouds on the horizon from the standpoint of
highway officials. Vermont, in a general revision of its highway condemna-
tion law in 1957, set up a rather elaborate, and apparently time-consuming,
quasi-judicial procedure for determining the necessity of particular highway
takings.' And in 1963 New Mexico enacted a law which pertains at least
indirectly to determinations of necessity in that it gives the governing bodies
of counties and municipalities a veto power over state highway relocations.9
One of the major concerns here apparently was the serious non-compensable
damages which roadside businesses sometimes suffer when a major highway
is relocated, but this seems like a rather drastic way of meeting the compen-
sation problem.
C. Statutory Authority to Condemn
Statutory delegation of condemnation power is perhaps the area which
we are inclined to think of first when we speak of the condemnor's right
to proceed with the condemnation. A review of appellate court decisions
in this area leads to the general conclusion that lack of statutory authority
certainly has not been any serious impediment to condemnation for highway
purposes. Nevertheless, the fact that the issue was raised in a substantial
number of cases indicates that there are potential trouble spots in the statu-
tory law pertaining to delegation of condemnation powers. The taking of
lands already devoted to public use, the taking of access rights, the taking of
lands within municipal boundaries, the taking of lands for peripheral high-
6. E.g., City of Carrollton v. Walker, 215 Ga. 505, 111 S.E.2d 79 (1959); Department
of Pub. Works & Bldgs. v. Lewis, 411 Ill. 242, 103 N.E.2d 595 (1952); Porter v. Iowa
State Highway Comm'n, 241 Iowa 1208, 44 N.W.2d 682 (1950).
7. Takings for future use were approved in State Road Dep't v. Southland, Inc., 117
So.2d 512 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1960); State Roads Comm'n v. Franklin, 201 Md. 549,
95 A.2d 99 (1953); Woollard v. Arkansas State Highway Comm'n, 220 Ark. 731, 249
S.W.2d 564 (1952). The taking for future use was disapproved in State ex reL. Sharp v.
0.62033 Acres of Land, 49 Del. 174, 112 A.2d 857 (1955).
8. Vt. Laws 1957, No. 242.
9. N.M. Laws 1963, ch. 114.
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way uses such as drainage or storage sheds, and the taking of lands by local
units of government as agents of state highway departments are examples of
areas which the cases tend to show are in need of attention."0
A review of state legislation since 1946 indicates that these are some of the
areas which also have received attention. A substantial number of states
have patched up their laws in various respects, including clearer specifica-
tions as to the type of property interest which may be condemned as well as
to the purposes for which property may be condemned." Almost invariably,
these amendments have tended to broaden the condemnation powers of the
state or local highway authorities involved. In addition, there has been sig-
nificant expansion in such areas as condemnation for limited-access facili-
ties, 2 condemnation for future highway use,13 condemnation of remnants
10. Taking of lands devoted to a public use: Muscolino v. Superior Court, 172 Cal.
App. 2d 525, 341 P.2d 773 (1959); Welch v. City and County of Denver, 141 Colo. 587,
349 P.2d 352 (1960); Canzonetti v. City of New Britain, 147 Conn. 478, 162 A.2d 695
(1960); Elberton So. Ry. v. State Highway Dep't, 211 Ga. 838, 89 S.E.2d 645 (1955);
Burnes v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 325 Mass. 731, 92 N.E.2d 381 (1950); City of
Goldsboro v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 246 N.C. 101, 97 S.E.2d 486 (1957); Dove v.
May, 201 Va. 761, 113 S.E.2d 840 (1960).
Taking of access rights: Department of Pub. Works & Bldgs. v. Finks, 10 Ill.2d 20,
139 N.E.2d 242 (1956); Luke v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, 337 Mass. 304, 149
N.E.2d 225 (1958); Hedrich v. Graham, 245 N.C. 249, 96 S.E.2d 129 (1957).
Taking by other agency for highway department: Blanton v. Fagerstrom, 249 Ala. 485,
31 So.2d 330 (1947); Martin v. Fulton County, 213 Ga. 761, 101 S.E.2d 716 (1958);
Tiller v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 201 Va. 222, 110 S.E.2d 209 (1959).
Taking for peripheral uses: Heppe v. State, 162 Neb. 403, 76 N.W.2d 255 (1956);
Webster v. Frawley, 262 Wis. 392, 55 N.W.2d 523 (1952).
Taking in municipality: Town of Greenwood Village v. District Court, 138 Colo. 283,
332 P.2d 210 (1958).
11. Among laws which clarified the type of interest which may be condemned are:
Ariz. Laws 1953, ch. 126; Idaho Laws 1953, ch. 100; Kan. Laws 1951, chs. 381-82;
N.J. Laws 1951, ch. 112; N.C. Laws, 1951, ch. 59; N.D. Laws 1953, ch. 177, § 90;
N.D. Laws 1959, ch. 267; Mich. Acts 1962, No. 22; Pa. Laws 1949, No. 71; S.C. Laws
1963, No. 149.
Among laws which clarified the relationship between condemnation powers of state
and local authorities were: Ala. Laws 1955, No. 566; Colo. Laws 1955, ch. 240; Kan.
Laws 1953; ch. 301; Ky. Acts 1952, ch. 180; N.D. Laws 1959, ch. 228.
Among laws involving expansion of powers to condemn for various peripheral high-
way uses were: N.D. Laws 1959, ch. 222; Ga. Laws 1953, No. 395; Md. Laws 1951,
ch. 608; Ohio Laws 1951, at 124; N.C. Laws 1947, ch. 806; Pa. Laws 1961, No. 325;
S.D. Laws 1957, ch. 25; Ill. Laws 1949, at 1023.
12. Versions of the Model Access Facility Law were enacted in Iowa (Ia. Laws 1955,
ch. 148), Kansas (Kan. Laws 1953, ch. 307), Kentucky (Ky. Acts 1946, ch. 225), Min-
nesota (Minn. Laws 1957, ch. 864), Mississippi (Miss. Laws 1956, ch, 314), New Mex-
ico (N.M. Laws 1957, ch. 234), North Carolina (N.C. Laws 1957, ch. 993), North
Dakota (N.D. Laws 1953, ch. 177, §§ 102-07), Oregon (Ore. Laws 1947, ch. 226), and
Wyoming (Wyo. Laws 1949, ch. 85). In addition a great many laws creating freeway
or tollway commissions and conferring condemnation powers upon them were enacted.
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or landlocked parcels,1 and condemnation of land to be exchanged for land
needed for highway purposes." Most legislation has been on a piecemeal
basis. However, a few states, usually in connection with a general revision
of their highway laws, have enacted comprehensive statutes delegating
power to condemn for highway purposes and listing a dozen or more pur-
poses as constituting highway purposes. A good example of a recent enact-
ment of such a statute is found in the new Utah highway code.16
III. THE RIGHT OF THE OWNER TO RECEIVE JUST COMPENSATION
It is a safe bet that the underlying issue in most condemnation litigation
is the amount of compensation to which the landowner is entitled. Even
in the appellate courts, almost two-thirds of the cases which were analyzed
contained compensation issues in the broad sense of the term. There con-
sequently has been no lack of opportunity for the courts to make new law
in this area. When the decisions are viewed in the aggregate, however, it is
difficult to discern an over-all trend toward either broadening or restricting
the scope of the landowner's right to compensation. It is possible to discern
apparent trends with regard to certain specific aspects of the law of com-
pensation, and a few of these will be commented upon later.
When we take into account what the state legislatures have done during
the last 15 or 16 years, the trend is clear-the scope of the landowner's
right to compensation gradually has been expanding. This is true even
though, for the most part, legislative activity has been confined to a half
dozen or so narrow segments of the law of compensation and even though
the legislatures of about a third of the states have done nothing to either
expand or restrict the scope of compensation.
For the purposes of this discussion, the law of compensation for taking
of property by eminent domain is considered to include three separate but
related topics: (a) rules governing compensability of specific items of loss
or damage; (b) rules for measuring value or damages; and (c) rules
pertaining to valuation evidence and its use. We turn now to an exami-
nation of some of the apparent trends in these three specific areas of the
law of compensation.
13. Examples of such laws are: Ky. Acts 1960, ch. 220; Kan. Laws 1963, ch. 333;
Mich. Acts 1957, No. 262, § 13a; Wash. Laws 1961, ch. 281, § 2.
14. Examples are: Alaska Laws 1960, ch. 122; Hawaii Laws 1951, No. 12, § 301;
Neb. Laws 1961, ch. 181, § 6; N.J. Laws 1952, ch. 21; Ill. Laws 1957, at 2042. The
Access Facility Law enacted in many states also embodies such powers.
15. Examples are: N.H. Laws 1959, ch. 294; Wash. Laws 1953, ch. 55.
16. Utah Laws 1963, ch. 39. Other examples are: Neb. Laws 1955, ch. 148; Ark.
Acts 1953, No. 419.
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A. Compensability of Specific Items of Loss or Damage
In considering first what the courts have done with the rules of law
limiting the scope of compensability, it seems desirable to focus on a few
areas in which the law has been in a state of uncertainty and in which there
consequently has been opportunity for judicial development of the law.
Compensability of damage due to impairment of access obviously is one of
these areas. The dozens of cases dealing with this subject in recent years
afford a reasonably good opportunity to observe the process of judicial
development of the law. Perhaps the basic proposition which underlies all
the decisions is that damage caused by interference with access is com-
pensable if the interference is unreasonable in view of the particular circum-
stances involved, for it is clear that not all injury due to interference with
access is compensable. As certain types of fact situations keep recurring,
however, the courts are likely to develop specific rules to govern specific
situations. Thus, a particular state is likely to have developed one rule to
govern the situation wherein traffic is diverted from the old highway to a
new one, another to govern the situation wherein access by means of a
service road is substituted for direct access, another to govern the situation
wherein a traffic divider or median strip is constructed in an existing high-
way, and so on." Partly because there is a lack of unanimity of opinion
among the courts of the several states as to what rule to apply in each situa-
tion, there is no readily apparent nationwide trend toward either expanding
or restricting compensability in the area of impairment of access rights. As
previously noted, there is a trend toward development of specific rules for
specific situations so that the vague standard of reasonableness tends to fade
more and more into the background. Perhaps judicial development of the
law in this area now has proceeded to a point where careful study could
lead to rules suitable for legislative enactment.
The question of whether the landowner is entitled to be reimbursed for
17. The case by case development of these rules can be illustrated by quoting from
the opinion in People v. Sayig, 101 Cal. App. 2d 890, 905, 226 P.2d 702, 712 (Dist. Ct.
App. Cal. 1951):
It is obvious that no general rule can be laid down to cover all situations. We know
that property placed in a cul-de-sac by reason of an improvement is entitled to com-
pensation for the depreciation of the property. Bacich case. We know that if prop-
erty is divided from the highway by an underpass and the only access to the high-
way is a service road, the property located on the service road has been legally
damaged. Ricciardi case. We also know that mere relocation of a highway thus
diverting traffic from the property does not legally damage the property. Holloway
v. Purcell, supra. We also know that the construction of a divided highway in front
of the property does not legally damage it. Holman case. The distinctions between
these various situations and their impact on the actual value of the property is
simply one of degree. Our case falls within the rule of the Holman case.
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his reasonable moving costs is another aspect of the law of compensability
which has been presented to the courts a number of times. Most of the
courts which have faced the issue appear to have been unwilling to expand
the traditional concept of just compensation to encompass such expenses."8
However, some have hedged on the subject, at least to the extent of allow-
ing the matter to go to the jury, 9 and one court has stated quite positively
that the landowner is entitled to be reimbursed for such expenses under the
constitutional guarantee of "full compensation."2 This is an area in which
state legislatures have been relatively active. Moving-cost statutes were en-
acted in at least half a dozen states during the period of 1951 to 1959, and
of course the pace has quickened since the enactment in 1962 of the federal
statute providing for federal participation in the payment of relocation
expenses. 2 '
Another area in which considerable pressure apparently has been exerted
toward expansion of the traditional concept of just compensation is that
pertaining to loss of customers, loss of good will, and consequent loss of
anticipated future profits of an existing business enterprise. Such losses can
be very real and very extensive, and there is a certain reliance interest here
which tends to evoke additional sympathy for the business entrepreneur
whose business will be adversely affected by the relocation of a highway or
by access limitations. We noted previously that a recent New Mexico law
prohibiting state highway relocation without the consent of the county or
municipal governing body apparently was concerned mainly with protecting
the interests of businesses established along the old highway, and it is possible
that some of the decisions in the field of access control may have been
influenced at least to some degree by the belief that substitution of indirect
access for direct access would adversely affect some of the businesses located
along the highway. When courts have been faced squarely with the ques-
tion of the compensability of loss of good will or business profits, however,
the answer usually has been that such damages are too speculative to be
18. See, e.g., Arkansas State Highway Comm'n v. Fox, 230 Ark. 287, 322 S.W.2d 81
(1959); People v. Auman, 100 Cal. App. 2d 262, 223 P.2d 260 (Dist. Ct. App. Cal.
1950); City of La Mesa v. Tweed & Gambrell Planing Mill, 146 Cal. App. 2d 762, 304
P.2d 803 (Dist. Ct. App. Cal. 1956); Williams v. State Highway Cormn'n, 252 N.C.
141, 113 S.E.2d 263 (1960).
19. Harvey Textile Co. v. Hill, 135 Conn. 686, 67 A.2d 851 (1949); State Highway
Dep't v. Robinson, 103 Ga. App. 12, 118 S.E.2d 289 (1961).
20. Jacksonville Expressway Authority v. Henry G. Du Pree Co., 108 So.2d 289 (Fla.
1958).
21. 76 Stat. 1146; 23 U.S.C. §133. State moving-cost statutes enacted prior to 1962
include: Tenn. Acts 1951, ch. 176; Conn. Laws 1957, No. 601; Md. Laws 1959, ch.
688; Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 656; R.I. Laws 1959, at 586; Wis. Laws 1959, at 838.
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compensable in eminent domain proceedings.22 Perhaps an answer closer
to the real truth is that the courts are fearful of the drain on the public
treasury which could result if business losses were to be made compensable
without careful restrictions. This is indicated by the attitude of the courts
of states in which the legislature has taken the lead to make business losses
compensable. For example, Vermont in 1957 enacted a statute expressly
making compensable the damages resulting from the taking or use of prop-
erty "and of the business thereon."2" The Vermont court has shown reluc-
tance to construe this statute broadly. The court was concerned in one case
that there may be many situations in which it is difficult to separate business
losses from damage to the land on which the business was conducted and
in which compensation both for damage to the land and for damage to the
business might lead to double compensation. 4 The court held in another
case that the statute was not intended to provide compensation for damages
due to the relocation of a highway. Whole communities might be seeking
damages under such circumstances, said the court.2"
Many more examples of the attitude of the courts toward compensability
of the various items of damage in eminent domain proceedings could be
given, but in the interest of brevity the above examples will have to suffice.
When we turn to what the state legislatures have done, the trend toward
expansion of the scope of compensability becomes more pronounced. There
have been at least 60 different enactments during the past 16 or 17 years
which were designed to expand the scope of compensability and very few
which were designed to restrict the scope of compensability. Prior to 1959,
however, these laws dealt only with narrow segments of the problem of
compensability. For example, most of these laws can be placed in one of
the following categories: (1) laws designed to compensate the owner or
occupant of condemned premises for part of the cost of removal and relo-
cation;2 (2) laws designed to provide compensation for crops or fixtures
located on the condemned premises or for damage caused to personal
22. E.g., Hot Spring County v. Crawford, 229 Ark. 518, 316 S.W.2d 834 (1958);
Williams v. State Highway Comm'n, 252 N.C. 141, 113 S.E.2d 263 (1960); Ryan v.
Davis, 201 Va. 79, 109 S.E.2d 409 (1959).
23. Vt. Laws 1957, ch. 242.
24. Penna v. State Highway Bd., 122 Vt. 290, 170 A.2d 630 (1961).
25. Spear v. State Highway Bd., 122 Vt. 406, 175 A.2d 511 (1961). It can also
be demonstrated that the Florida court has not shown any inclination to expand the
scope of the "business loss" statute of that state beyond its literal terms. See Hooper v.
State Road Dep't, 105 So.2d 515 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1958); City of Tampa v. Texas
Co., 107 So.2d 216 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1958); Florida State Turnpike Authority v.
Anhoco Corp., 107 So.2d 51 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1958), modified, 116 So.2d 8 (1959);
Guarria v. State Road Dep't, 117 So.2d 5 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1960).
26. See note 21, supra.
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property;2" (3) laws dealing with prorating of real estate taxes on the con-
demned premises for the year of condemnation;2 8 (4) laws designed to
compensate the landowner for expenses incurred in defending a condemna-
tion action which subsequently is abandoned by the condemnor; 21 (5) laws
designed to provide the landowner with compensation in the form of inter-
est on the award during periods when he neither had possession nor a right
to receive payment of the award ;o and (6) occasional enactments designed
to expand the scope of litigation expenses which the landowner is entitled
to recover. 1
Since 1959 there appears to have been some tendency for state legislatures
to take a broader look at rules of compensability in eminent domain proceed-
ings. This usually occurs in connection with general revision bills. Thus,
the 1959 Wisconsin revision incorporated several rules designed to expand
compensability. 2 The same is true of a 1963 Kansas revision bill, but the
bill was amended prior to adoption to delete most of these rules." A 1963
Maryland revision provided for some expansion of the scope of compen-
sability. 4 And, although it failed of enactment, a 1963 Pennsylvania revi-
sion bill"5 dramatically illustrated what appears to be a growing trend
toward legislative clarification, codification and expansion of the rules for
27. Cal. Laws 1957, ch. 1098; Conn. Laws 1957, No. 659; Iowa Laws 1959, ch. 318.
28. Tex. Laws 1951, ch. 484; Mass. Laws 1953, ch. 634; Cal. Laws 1953, ch. 1792;
Cal. Laws 1961, ch. 1612.
29. Ore. Laws 1947, chs. 283, 533; (D.C.) 61 Stat. 312 (1947); P.R. Laws 1949,
No. 286; Nev. Laws 1955, ch. 188; N.C. Laws 1957, ch. 400.
30. Conn. Laws 1957, No. 632; Idaho Laws 1957, ch. 127; Mass. Laws 1960, ch. 298;
Neb. Laws 1951, ch. 101; Neb. Laws 1959, ch. 351; Nev. Laws 1960, ch. 239.
31. Iowa Laws 1955, ch. 226; Conn. Laws 1957, No. 632; N.D. Laws 1957, ch.
226; Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 656.
32. Wis. Laws 1959, ch. 639. Among items of damages made compensable were:
(a) damages due to change of grade; (b) cost of realigning personal property on the
same site when necessitated by a partial taking or a restriction of access; (c) the cost of
removing personal property to another site, subject to limitations; (d) refinancing costs,
subject to limitations; (e) net rental losses resulting from vacancies during the year pre-
ceding the taking; and (f) expenses of plans and specifications rendered useless because
of the taking.
33. Senate Bill No. 184 (1963 Session) which, in amended form, became Kan. Laws
1963, ch. 234. Among provisions deleted from the bill prior to enactment were provi-
sions which would have (a) reimbursed the owner for cost of removal of his personal
property to another location, (b) reimbursed him for increased cost of new financing, (c)
compensated him for damage due to loss of business directly resulting from the taking,
and (d) reimbursed the owner for the cost of plans rendered useless.
34. Md. Laws 1963, ch. 52.
35. House Bill No. 683 (1963 Session).
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determining compensation in condemnation proceedings. The bill blazed
new trails in the direction of legislatively-defined compensability rules, valua-
tion rules, and evidential rules for condemnation proceedings.
B. Rules for Measuring Value or Damages
The rules for measuring value or damages of course also affect scope of
compensability, but we are dealing here with rules such as the fair market
value rule for measuring the value of property taken, the "before and after"
or "value of the part taken plus damages" rules for determining compen-
sation in severance situations, and the like, rather than with rules stating
whether specific items of damage are or are not compensable. Also included
in this category are rules pertaining to set-off of benefits, date of valuation,
and the valuation of interest less than a fee simple. Although there has been
a fair amount of litigation with regard to rules of valuation, it is difficult to
discern any general trends in this area. It appears to be an area which
merits further study. For example, a considerable amount of confusion
appears to arise from the fact that there are two generally used rules for
determining compensation in severance situations;" there do not appear to
be any clear-cut rules for differentiating between general and special bene-
fits; " there appears to be a considerable amount of confusion as to what
rules apply to the valuation of leasehold interests under various circum-
stances.3"
36. Examples of this confusion can be found in the following cases: Morgan County
v. Hill, 257 Ala. 658, 60 So.2d 838 (1952); Shelby County v. Hatfield, 264 Ala. 488,
88 So.2d 842 (1956); State ex rel. Morrison v. Jay Six Cattle Co., 88 Ariz. 97, 353 P.2d
185 (1960); Sorenson v. Cox, 132 Conn. 583, 46 A.2d 125 (1946); Barry v. State, 103
N.H. 141, 167 A.2d 437 (1961); Lineberg v. Sandven, 74 N.D. 364, 21 N.W.2d 808
(1946); Stringer v. Board of County Comm'rs, 347 P.2d 197 (Wyo. 1959).
37. Among cases which have considered this problem are: Ball v. Independence
County, 214 Ark. 694, 217 S.W.2d 913 (1949); Koelsch v. Arkansas State Highway
Comm'n, 223 Ark. 529, 267 S.W.2d 4 (1954); People v. Thomas, 108 Cal. App. 2d 832,
239 P.2d 914 (1952); Boxberger v. State Highway Comm'n, 126 Colo. 526, 251 P.2d
920 (1952); Cuneo v. City of Chicago, 400 Ill. 545, 81 N.E.2d 451 (1948) ; State v.
Smith, 237 Ind. 72, 143 N.E.2d 666 (1957); Phillips v. State, 167 Neb. 541, 93 N.W.2d
635 (1958); D'Angelo v. Director of Pub. Works, 89 R.I. 267, 152 A.2d 211 (1959);
Townsend v. State, 257 Wis. 329, 43 N.W.2d 458 (1950).
38. Among cases which have considered this problem are: City of Dothan v. Wilkes,
269 Ala. 444, 114 So.2d 237 (1959); State ex rel. Morrison v. Carlson, 83 Ariz. 363, 321
P.2d 1025 (1958); Orange State Oil Co. v. Jacksonville Expressway Authority, 110
So.2d 687 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1959); Department of Pub. Works & Bldgs. v. Bohne,
415 I1. 253, 113 N.E.2d 319 (1953); Batcheller v. Iowa State Highway Comm'n, 251
Iowa 364, 101 N.W.2d 30 (1960); Veirs v. State Roads Comm'n, 217 Md. 545, 143
A.2d 613 (1958).
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For the most part, state legislatures have made few attempts in recent
years to clarify or codify rules of valuation. There appears, however, to be
a trend toward codification of the more important valuation rules in con-
nection with the general revision of condemnation procedures. 9 A few
states also have enacted rules to cover unusual or especially difficult valua-
tion problems."0
C. Rules of Evidence
Issues pertaining to evidence were involved in almost one out of three of
the cases studied. Some of these issues do not have any special significance
from the standpoint of eminent domain law as such, but many of them do.
Insofar as a trend is discernible, there appears to be a trend toward liberal-
ization of the rules pertaining to qualifications of witnesses and admissibility
of evidence. For example, there is some indication that the rules pertaining
to qualifications of expert valuation witnesses are being liberalized." The
courts of some states which previously excluded evidence of sales of com-
parable properties now admit such evidence." Evidence of income and of
cost of reproduction is admitted with more reluctance than evidence of sales,
yet there appears to be growing judicial sentiment that business income
should not be completely ignored in the fixing of the value of the property
taken.' A substantial number of the cases have dealt with the question of
the admissibility of evidence of the owner's intended use of the land and of
39. For example, the "before and after" rule, as well as certain other valuation rules,
were codified in connection with revisions in North Carolina (N.C. Laws 1959, ch.
1025), Wisconsin (Wis. Laws 1959, ch. 639) and Kansas (Kan. Laws 1963, ch. 234).
Valuation rules also were codified in the recent Maine and Maryland revisions (Me.
Laws 1961, ch. 295; Md. Laws 1963, ch. 52).
40. E.g., Cal. Laws 1963, ch. 1204 (valuation of park property); Wash. Laws 1956,
ch. 156 (building located partly on land taken).
41. For example, in two Massachusetts cases in which the trial court had refused to
permit expert witnesses to testify because the witnesses did not have local experience in
buying and selling property, the cases were reversed on appeal. The Supreme Judicial
Court noted that local conditions do not have the controlling significance in many cases
that they had in the pre-automobile era and that there is often more occasion for employ-
ing a qualified appraiser of wide experience than to rely only on persons who have had
local experience. Muzi v. Commonwealth, 335 Mass. 101, 138 N.E.2d 578 (1956);
Newton Girl Scout Council, Inc. v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, 335 Mass. 189,
138 N.E.2d 769 (1956).
42. See County of Los Angeles v. Faus, 48 Cal.2d 672, 312 P.2d 680 (1957); Red-
field v. Iowa State Highway Comm'n, 251 Iowa 332, 99 N.W.2d 413 (1959).
43. See, e.g., State Roads Comm'n v. Novosel, 203 Md. 619, 102 A.2d 563 (1954)
(capitalization of business profits should be avoided, but it was not error for land-
owner's expert witness to have taken into account in valuing the land the profitable
nature of the business conducted thereon); State by Lord v. LaBarre, 255 Minn. 309,
96 N.W.2d 642 (1959) (evidence that the gross sales of a supermarket were increasing
was admissible for the purpose of showing that the lease was becoming more valuable).
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the suitability of the land for subdivision purposes.4 The courts do not
appear to have been able or willing to develop precise rules in this area.
The answer in any particular case appears to depend on the court's judg-
ment as to the utility of the evidence in establishing market value, weighed
against the number of misleading and time-consuming collateral issues which
the evidence might introduce in the case.
There has been very little legislative activity with regard to rules of evi-
dence pertaining to condemnation cases. An exception to the general rule
was the Pennsylvania revision bill introduced in 1963. It attempted to set
forth in some detail the rules of evidence which frequently are in issue in
condemnation proceedings. The bill contained rules with regard to jury
view, with regard to qualifications of expert valuation witnesses, and with
regard to the permissible testimony of such witnesses. It is anyone's guess
whether this portends a trend toward codification of rules dealing with the
more common evidential issues in condemnation cases.
IV. CONDEMNATION PROCEDURE
Condemnation procedure is of course an important part of condemna-
tion law. Issues pertaining to condemnation procedure were involved in
almost half of the cases studied, and at least 200 different legislative enact-
ments pertaining to condemnation procedure may be counted during the
period of 1946 to 1963. We customarily think of condemnation procedure
as being statutory. Nevertheless, the courts have played an important role
in the development of condemnation procedures. At times, statutory proce-
dures have been so sketchy that the courts necessarily have had to supply
the missing rules. At other times, the courts in deciding cases have pointed
out defects or ambiguities which subsequently were corrected by legislative
action. Finally, the legislatures of a few states recently have taken the
position that it is the function of the supreme courts of those states to pro-
mulgate procedural rules for condemnation proceedings.41
Notwithstanding this role of the courts, it is true that the principal devel-
44. E.g., Etowah County v. Clubview Heights Co., 267 Ala. 355, 102 So.2d 9 (1958);
State v. Goodwyn, 272 Ala. 618, 133 So.2d 375 (1961); State ex rel. Morrison v. Jay Six
Cattle Co., 88 Ariz. 97, 353 P.2d 185 (1960); Arkansas State Highway Comm'n v.
0. & B., Inc., 227 Ark. 739, 301 S.W.2d 5 (1957); Arkansas State Highway Comm'n v.
Watkins, 229 Ark. 27, 313 S.W.2d 86 (1958); Tift v. State Highway Dep't, 99 Ga. App.
387, 108 S.E.2d 724 (1959); Department of Pub. Works & Bldgs. v. Lambert, 411 Il.
183, 103 N.E.2d 356 (1952); Aselbekian v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, 341
Mass. 398, 169 N.E.2d 863 (1960); State by Lord v. LaBarre, 255 Minn. 309, 96
N.W.2d 642 (1959); Wishek Inv. Co. v. McIntosh County, 77 N.D. 685, 45 N.W.2d
417 (1950); L'Etolle v. Director of Pub. Works, 89 R.I. 394, 153 A.2d 173 (1959).
45. Alaska Laws 1962, ch. 101; Md. Laws 1963, ch. 52.
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opments in condemnation procedure during recent years have resulted from
statutory enactments. Many of these developments have come about
through piecemeal amendments, but there also appears to be a trend toward
legislative revision of state condemnation laws in the form of major revision
bills. Several states have undertaken such revisions, with the result that
statutory condemnation procedures have been improved and clarified.4
There does not seem to be sufficient evidence at this time, however, to
conclude that there is a definite trend toward consolidation of condemnation
procedures. Some states, instead of revising or patching up existing proce-
dures, simply have piled one new procedure on top of another."
When we discussed the two other major areas of condemnation law-
that pertaining to the right of the condemnor to condemn and that pertain-
ing to the right of the landowner to receive just compensation-we were able
to say that the over-all trend in the first area has favored the condemnor and
in the second area the landowner. In the area of condemnation procedure,
on the other hand, there have been two major trends running side by side-
one tending to favor the condemnor and the other the landowner. These
trends, however, are consistent with the two major trends previously noted
in that procedural changes pertaining to the condemnor's right to condemn
and to obtain quick possession of the desired property generally have favored
the condemnor while procedural changes pertaining to the landowner's
right to receive just compensation generally have favored the landowner.
We now will look at these two trends in somewhat more detail.
A. Procedures Designed to give the Condemnor Possession
Almost every state has enacted procedures designed to give the con-
demnor possession of the property at an early stage of the proceedings.
Many of these laws were in existence prior to 1946, but many of them also
have been enacted since that time.4" In general the courts have been sym-
46. Some of the more recent revisions were in North Carolina (N.C. Laws 1959, ch.
1025), Wisconsin (Wis. Laws 1959, ch. 639), Virginia (Va. Acts 1960, ch. 491; Va.
Acts, 1962, ch. 426), Maine (Me. Laws 1961, ch. 295), Alaska (Alaska Laws 1962, ch.
101), Kansas (Kan. Laws 1963, ch. 234), Maryland (Md. Laws, 1963, ch. 52) and
West Virginia (W. Va. Acts 1963, ch. 65).
47. Consolidations took place in Delaware (48 Del. Laws 1951, ch. 271), Nebraska
(Neb. Laws 1951, ch. 101), and Kansas (Kan. Laws 1963, ch. 234). On the other
hand, supplemental procedures were enacted in Georgia (Ga. Laws 1957, at 387; Ga.
Laws 1961, at 517), Louisiana (La. Acts 1954, No. 107), New Mexico (N.M. Laws
1959, ch. 324), and Tennessee (Tenn. Acts 1959, ch. 216). Most of the other states
which had revisions either had a uniform procedure to begin with or retained separate
procedures for different types of takings.
48. Some of the post-1946 enactments were: Ill. Laws 1947, at 905; La. Acts 1948,
No. 326; Alaska Laws, 1953, ch. 90; Idaho Laws 1953, ch. 252; La. Acts 1954, No. 107;
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pathetic to such statutes, although a few states have had difficulty enacting
constitutional quick-taking statutes."9 Another trend which appears when
one views recent legislative enactments in this area is a trend toward refine-
ment of existing immediate-possession procedures. In this refinement proc-
ess, it appears that both the condemnor and the landowner have benefited.
The revised procedures often provide for better notice to interested parties,
for clearer procedures for testing the validity of the taking and the adequacy
of the deposit which usually is a prerequisite to possession by the condemnor,
and for other adjustments which experience has shown to be necessary or
desirable."s Another aspect of this refinement process is to permit the owner
to withdraw the deposit under appropriate safeguards. 1 Many of the earlier
immediate-possession statutes did not permit such withdrawal. Because the
condemnor usually is not required to pay interest on deposits which the
landowner is entitled to withdraw, these withdrawal procedures may work
to the advantage of the condemnor as well as the landowner.
B. Procedures for Determining Just Compensation
Many amendments designed to improve procedures for determining com-
pensation in condemnation proceedings have been enacted in recent years.
On the whole the revised procedures afford greater protection to the land-
owner's rights than did the old procedures. There has been some tendency,
for example, to get away from the old "laying out" procedures in connection
Ill. Laws 1957, at 2603; N.M. Laws 1959, ch. 324; Tenn. Acts 1959, ch. 216; N.D.
Laws 1961, ch. 274; S.D. Laws 1963, ch. 195.
49. Among states which have had some difficulty are Georgia and Illinois. Immediate
possession statutes were held invalid in Pilgreen v. City of Atlanta, 204 Ga. 710, 51
S.E.2d 655 (1949) and in Department of Pub. Works & Bldgs. v. Gorbe, 409 Ill. 211,
98 N.E.2d 730 (1951). However, both states subsequently enacted valid immediate pos-
session procedures without amending their constitutions. See, O.K. Inc. v. State High-
way Dep't, 213 Ga. 666, 100 S.E.2d 906 (1957); Department of Pub. Works & Bldgs. v.
Butler Co., 13 Ill.2d 537, 150 N.E. 2d 124 (1958). North Dakota also experienced diffi-
culty until its constitution was amended in 1956. See Kessler v. Thompson, 75 N.W.2d
172 (N.D. 1956). Although Idaho and Washington are among those states whose case
law generally is not treated in this paper (see note 1, supra), it might be pointed out
that those states also have had immediate possession statutes invalidated. See Yellowstone
Pipeline Co. v. Drummond, 77 Idaho 36, 287 P.2d 288 (1955); State ex rel. Eastvold v.
Yelle, 46 Wash.2d 166, 279 P. 645 (1955).
50. Some examples are: Ark. Acts 1963, No. 99 (certain restrictions on withdrawal
of deposit by landowner added); Cal. Laws 1961, ch. 1613 (better notice to landowner
and other changes); Conn. Laws 1957, No. 384 (better notice to landowner; increased
deposit); Fla. Laws 1959, ch. 59-297 (reduction in required deposit); Mont. Laws 1961,
ch. 234 (date of possession advanced).
51. Among laws providing for such withdrawal were: Md. Laws 1950, ch. 54; Va.
Acts 1956, ch. 565; Cal. Laws 1957, ch. 2022; Va. Acts 1958, ch. 581; Neb. Laws 1959,
ch. 351; Ind. Laws 1961, ch. 317; R.I. Laws 1961, ch. 166.
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with land acquisitions for highway purposes.52 These procedures typically
provided for the making of an award by a local administrative body, gen-
erally with very little opportunity for a hearing on the issues involved. If
the landowner was dissatisfied, he had the burden of going to court to
attempt to obtain some redress. This is not to say that there has been a
trend away from administrative condemnation procedures. For example,
both Maine and Wisconsin in the recent revisions of their condemnation
laws retained the administrative award procedure for highway condemna-
tion purposes.53 However, the laws were substantially revised so as to give
perhaps as good protection to the landowner's rights as he would be likely
to have in any judicial condemnation proceeding.
Turning to the more specific changes which have been made in condem-
nation proceedings, we find that amendments designed to improve notice
procedures have been quite common.54 Amendments designed to improve
procedures for payment of compensation and for settling conflicting claims
also were enacted in many states.55 In addition, there has been a great deal
of patchwork which is more difficult to classify.
There is one area of compensation procedure which has hardly been
touched by legislative activity but which has been a fruitful source of liti-
gation. This is the procedure for determining the landowner's light to com-
pensation when his property allegedly has been taken or damaged by a
highway agency without any formal action on the part of that agency. The
proceedings sometimes are referred to as "inverse condemnation," but they
make take many different forms. The courts usually manage to find that the
landowner has a remedy, but it would seem that a well-conceived statutory
procedure might be useful here.
CONCLUSION
If we were to attempt to summarize in a few words the post-war trends
in highway condemnation law, we would have to say that two general trends
appear to emerge from the mass of court decisions and legislative enact-
ments: (a) there has been a tendency for both courts and legislatures to
52. E.g., N.J. Laws 1953, ch. 27; R.I. Laws 1962, ch. 216. A summary "sheriff's jury"
procedure in Maryland was repealed in 1962. Md. Laws 1962, ch. 36.
53. Wis. Laws 1959, ch. 639; Me. Laws 1961, ch. 295.
54. Among these were: Cal. Laws 1959, ch. 1573; Fla. Laws 1953, ch. 28282;
Ill. Laws 1951, at 1850; Kan. Laws 1955, ch. 213; Minn. Laws 1957, ch. 728; N.H.
Laws 1955, ch. 56; Tenn. Acts 1959, ch. 194; Tex. Laws 1961, ch. 105; W. Va. Acts
1957, chs. 82, 83, 84; Wis. Laws 1953, ch. 308.
55. Among these were: Ill. Laws 1959, at 157; Kan. Laws 1961, chs. 208, 209;
La. Acts 1954, Nos. 47, 48; R.I. Laws 1962, ch. 76; Wis. Laws 1953, ch. 308.
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look with favor upon the right of the highway authorities to condemn the
property needed for highway construction and to acquire quick possession
so that the improvement projects could proceed without delay; and (b)
there has been a gradual trend toward expanding the scope of the land-
owner's right to receive compensation for some of the consequential damages
which previously were considered to be noncompensable and toward im-
proving the procedures whereby such right may be exercised.
Most of the changes which have taken place in highway condemnation
law in recent years have been brought about by legislative action. How-
ever, there are areas of the law which have been left largely to the courts
to develop and which now perhaps have been developed to a point where
legislative statement of the rules might be warranted in the interest of clarity
and of forestalling litigation. In fact, the time would seem to be ripe for
the development of a model condemnation law which would synthesize the
best features of the condemnation laws which already have been fashioned
by the courts and legislatures of the several states and which could be drawn
upon by the states in further improving their condemnation laws. One of
the products of the study on which this paper is based hopefully will be at
least a first draft of such a law.
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